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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HELEN MINING COMPANY, 
Petitioner 
        
v. 
 
HELEN FAIRMAN, Widow of CLARK FAIRMAN; and  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
   Respondents 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision and Order 
Of the Benefits Review Board 
 (BRB No. 10-0494 BLA) 
Administrative Law Judge: Honorable Michael P. Lesniak 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
 







GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Helen Mining Company (“Helen Mining”) petitions for review of a decision and 
final order of the Benefits Review Board (“the Board”) of the United States Department 
of Labor affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision and order granting 
respondent Helen Fairman’s (“Fairman”) claim for survivor’s benefits under the Black 
Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.  For the reasons stated herein, we will deny 
the petition for review.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts.   
Clark M. Fairman, Sr. was employed as a coal miner for approximately nineteen 
years.  After he asserted that he had developed pneumoconiosis based on his employment 
as a coal miner, the Department of Labor awarded him lifetime black lung benefits on 
April 18, 1997.  Clark Fairman continued receiving benefits until the time of his death on 
January 26, 2008.  On March 23, 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“PPACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 119, 
260.  It amended § 932(l) of the Black Lung Benefits Act, to provide for automatic 
entitlement to benefits for survivors of miners who received benefits.  
On May 3, 2010, after a formal hearing, Administrative Law Judge Michael P. 
Lesniak awarded black lung benefits to Helen Fairman.  On April 29, 2011, the Board 
affirmed the ALJ’s award of benefits.  The Board determined that Fairman was entitled to 
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survivor’s benefits under 30 U.S.C. § 932(l), as amended by the PPACA, based on her 
late husband’s disabling pneumoconiosis.   
Helen Mining petitioned our Court for review of the Board’s decision ordering it 
to pay Helen Fairman all of the benefits to which she is entitled as a surviving spouse.  
We held this case C.A.V., pending the Supreme Court’s decisions in Department of 
Health and Human Services, et al v. Florida, (No. 11-398), National Federation of 
Independent Business, et al v. Sebelius, (No. 11-393) and Florida v. Department of 
Health and Human Services, (No. 11-400).     
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Board had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 
921(b)(3).  We have jurisdiction over Helen Mining’s petition for review under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 921(c)(3).  “We review the decisions of the Board for errors of law and to assure that it 
has adhered to its own standard of review.”  BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 39 F.3d 458, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1994).  We exercise plenary 
review over all questions of law.  Id. at 463. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
    Helen Mining’s petition presents five issues for our consideration:  (1) whether 
the PPACA is unconstitutional, and whether any unconstitutional provisions should be 
severed or the entire Act deemed unenforceable; (2) whether the application of the 
amendments to the Black Lung Act, both retroactively and prospectively, is a violation of 
Helen Mining’s Fifth Amendment right to due process under the Takings Clause; (3) 
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whether application of § 1556 of the PPACA results in irreconcilable inconsistencies in 
the Black Lung Act, requiring it to be struck down; (4) whether the Award should be 
vacated and the claim held in abeyance until the Department of Labor issues new 
regulations implementing PPACA amendments; and (5) whether the application of the 
PPACA violated the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). 
In light of the Supreme Court’s June 28, 2012, decision holding the individual 
mandate of the PPACA to be constitutional, Helen Mining’s first argument must fail.1  
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (“The 
Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not 
obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax.  Because the 
Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom 
or fairness.”). 
Furthermore, Helen Mining concedes that our decision in B & G Construction Co., 
Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 662 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 
2011) “essentially resolv[es] all [other] issues raised in [its] brief.”  Pet’r’s Mot. to Hold 
Appeal in Abeyance 4, Nov. 21, 2011.  In B & G Construction, we considered the 
Takings Clause question and held that the amended § 932(l) did not constitute an 
unconstitutional taking.  662 F.3d at 260-63.  We also rejected the argument that 
amended § 932(l) is inconsistent with the Act’s general statement of purpose.  Id. at 258.   
                                                     
1
 Because the Supreme Court found the PPACA’s individual mandate to be 
constitutional, Helen Mining’s severability argument is moot. 
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Although we did not explicitly address the questions of whether new regulations 
are necessary to properly implement section 1556 or whether the application of the 
PPACA violated the APA based on an alleged reallocation of the burden of proof 
regarding the cause of death, our opinion in B & G Construction similarly resolves the 
key issues underlying each of these claims.  For example, Helen Mining argues that the 
ALJ employed an erroneous interpretation of section 1556 when it implemented the 
amendments contained in the PPACA and suggests that we hold the case in abeyance 
pending additional guidance from the Department of Labor.  However, this argument 
fails in light of our conclusion in B & G Construction that “section 1556 . . . negates any 
language suggesting that an eligible survivor of a miner who was eligible to receive 
benefits at the time of his death must file a new claim in order to prove that the miner’s 
death was due to the effects of pneumoconiosis.”  Id. at 252 (supporting the ALJ’s 
interpretation of section 1556 and its application of the PPACA amendments).   
Similarly, Helen Mining’s APA argument is grounded in an assertion that the 
section 1556 amendments could be read as an automatic entitlement provision, thus 
eviscerating the claimant’s burden of proof in violation of section 7(c) of the APA.  See 5 
U.S.C. § 556(d) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or 
order has the burden of proof.”)  Section 1556 does not remove the claimant’s burden of 
proof, but rather adjusts the conditions and procedures for establishing entitlement.
2
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 In B & G Construction, we disagreed with the petitioner’s assertion that section 1556 




B & G Constr., 662 F.3d at 254.  The absence of burden-shifting, coupled with the fact 
that Fairman’s claim met the requisite burden of proof because her husband was already 
receiving benefits, indicates that section 7(c) of the APA is not implicated here.       
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we will deny the petition for review.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
[B]y eliminating the need for a widow to show causation between the 
miner’s pneumoconiosis and his death Congress simply has set forth as 
substantive law a provision that the survivor of a miner receiving benefits is 
entitled to survivor’s benefits regardless of the absence of causation 
between the miner’s pneumoconiosis and his death.  As we explain below, 
we cannot understand why it cannot do so as there is no principle of law 
barring it from adopting that approach.  Thus, properly understood, section 
1556 does not create a presumption [of entitlement to benefits] at all. 
B & G Constr., 662 F.3d at 254. 
